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Intro,3not ion :
A deeply .structured dualism typically characterizes third
n . . . .wcrlci ,imn^ eco.n om.ies. A relatively small percentage of the
national labor force, working in an isolated enclave, employs 
mooern, nign.ly complex, eapical-ifctensive machinep and equipment 
to dig out rich minerals and freignts tnem in bigh.-powered 
trains or trucks to i .reign factories. The managers of the mines 
import almost all the inputs: the machinery, the materials used
for construction of the mines, the workers' houses, the roads -- 
even the foodstuffs the workers eat.
Outside the mining enclaves, the great majority of the popu- /• 
lations, mostly p asants, commonly live ir. grinding poverty. Few 
can afford to buy any of the final products fabricated fr their 
nation's mineral wealth in faraway lands. Their main hope for es­
cape is to migrate to overcrowded slums adjacent to the vines, 
joining the growing ranks of unemployed looking for paid jobs...
The mines gear the national economy to the fluctuations of an 
uncertain world market. They produce a major share or the govern­
ment's revenues. When prices for exported ores rise, those -eaters 
associated with the mines boom. The government spends augmented 
revenues to build shhools , hospitals, roads. Construction i r. d u 1 p i ^ ~ 
hire workers who buy food and clothing, stimulating local facto ■-•ie<- 
or, more often, expanding imports. But when mineral pric^o foil 
the entire economy stagnates. The government must borrov 
to pay on-going expenses, incurring n avy international debt c.
Frequently, it must request International Monetary "bond assistance 
and accent the 'austerity' measures trie ortnodov IMF doctors advi-e^ 
Clash government, expen l i t s  and employ m nt, deval x~ cum^r.wt ^
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(.thus raising the cost of imported goods on which the ec >no.ny 
•flas come to depend) and raise taxes, especially on middle and 
iover income families.
This chapter aims to summarize the evidence as to the causes 
0i this pattern of externally dependent dualism which condemns 
the majority of the populations of mining economies to poverty.
On that foundation, it will outline the kinds of policies which 
the'experience of the independent countries of Africa suggest 
may be most likely to help overcome them.
The explanations:
The transnational mining companies which establish most mining 
enclaves in third world nations primarily seek raw materials for 
their own factories in their home countries. They introduce machinery 
and equipment embodying the most advanced technologies developed 
in their factories at home, ensuring their control over the mining 
projects and their outputs competitiveness in the world market.
They control the international marketing networks through which they 
sell the ores.. They freqqently own the factories -which fabricate 
the final products. They keep their eyes on the bottom line: the
maximiaation of their global profits. They drain investable sur­
pluses from tne project directly in the form of profits, dividends, 
interest, high salaries and/or managering and. licencing fees for the 
technologies they introduce —  sometimes totalling as much as a 
third of the mining economy's national protract. If government 
demands too high a share of profits through taxes or ownersyi^ of 
snares, they may siphon profits out indirectly b^ raising the 
cost of imported machinery and equipment and/or lowering the prices 
paid by their international marketing network of the exported crude 
or semi-refined ores.
Where an independent government seeks to augment the national
returns from the mines, it typically fails to take adequate 
measures to create a new pattern of self-sustained growth by 
initiating a transformation to a balanced, integrated economy- 
capable of providing increasingly productive employment oppor­
tunities and raising living standards in every sector. Instead, 
when world mineral prices are high, it tends to spend its aug­
mented revenues on expansion of the civil service to provide 
roads, schools, hospitals, energy projects -- the infrastructure 
which western orthodoxy recommends tc stimulate private investments 
productive activities. The government has been structured t - pur­
sue this advice: Its ministries know how to build schools, roads,
hospitals, energy projects. Its personnel have been schooled t~- 
believe that the civil service should not enter into productive 
sector activities. If government ever should enter the^lbtter, 
it should do so through parastatals, autonomous state corporations 
which behave as much as possible like private enterprise-.
but private investors -- whether domestic >r foreign -- invent
in those areas of the alrea-y distorted economy where shortte: 
profits will be highest: speculative trade and real e: tate r.d
a .irnited range of import-substitution industries catering t the 
needs of the narrow high income elite (typically located in the 
export enclave, using imported machines and materials and ,;r vid'r1 — 1 Jc
: ev; obc). And government-created parastatals, sinking 4- -* .y-1 at
indu. trial groutn -- oft-sn witr. no other criteria than to attempt 
to maximize profits -- not infrequently follow b u-'.w
Meanwhile, the government has created new nig i paying posts for 
growing numbers of civil servants staffing toe growing number of
new in astructurnl posts. If it
ft - u J_n£ O l* t C 110(r. . V■ 3 -L j1’ f ft]*iy
ctaolisr.es pnrastatal s,
i nereasi ugly
their
Xi- age- s.
like a state within a state; they make decisions as to wnon to 
employ, what to produce, and how t- produce it. They often rely 
on the advice of foreign 'partners' eager to sell them new tech­
nologies and semi-processed materials.
Nobody planned it that way, but a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'
Vand associated 'managerial bourgeoisie' save emerged. Not infre­
quently, these individuals take advantage cf their new posts t line¥
their own pockets: They discover that they can obtain 10 percent on
ontracts with foreign partners; they borrow money from banks to fi­
nance their entry into speculative real estate and trade, taking 
advantage of inside knowledge; and channel government funds into 
their own projects. But the growth of the bureaucratic/managerial 
bourgeosie is not caused by corruption; corruption is a by-product 
of the emergence of a bureaucratic/managerial bourgeoisie: top
level government civil servants and para„tatal personnel, appointed
within the framework of inherited institut ior.s„ operating on the 
lines of conventional wisdom, who benefit from as well as become 
the key actors shaping government policies.
Theh the rubble of mining prosperity inevitably bursts. Trans­
national corporations reinvest their accumulated profits ir new 
technologies at home that reduce the necessity for the mineral ex­
ports on vhich the mining ec nonies depend. Scrap metals red]ace 
ores. Synthetics replace metals. In recent years, the cere indus­
trial countries have been increasingly wracked by economic crises 
and stagnation, further cutting their demand for mining economies' 
crude ores.
Wt 1 e r. t h e w arid L, ice 
ro -cr..mert fit. 's itself
\ ypurest atal projects. T]
fur its experts roilapse, the mining economy' 
saddled with expensive infrastridetural and 
rese require the continued import of parts
uove:-n.".en‘ ; v e r.u e: C Oi. n -C:::
reserves disappear. The government must borrow funds, at home, 
stimulating inflation, and/or abroad, incurring mounting foreign 
debts which it cannot repay as long as its minerals sell only for . 
low prices. Eventually, it must turn to the IMF -- and submit 
to IMF 'discipline.' Those shaping governmental decisi ns almost 
invariably concur with IMF proposals t' throw the burden of the 
ensuing crisis on the peasantry and wage earners: Lay off govern­
ment employees, raise taxes on lower and middle income families, 
devalue the currency.
Proposals for solution:
Examination of the above explanations suggests a range of possi­
ble solutions. Obviously, nojone can formulate a blue-print, but the 
widespread experience of third world mining economies suggests 
a number of measures to overcome the problems they typically con­
front. Implementation of these kinds of proposals assumes, however, 
that those who initially take over state power really do seek -- 
at least at the outset -- to restructure the national political 
economy to meet the needs of the majority of the population. This 
cid not seem an unreasonable assumption in many of the African states
\°/1960sV/ewhen they attained independence in the ^Y t she explanation above 
suggests their new governments' efforts to attain development along 
conventional lines within the framework of* inherited institutions 
almost inevitably shaped a bureaueratic/mangerial boureoisie which, 
in the end, sought only to perpetuate the status quo which gavr 
it power and privilege. The political leaders of countries like 
Moaarr.bique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola, which carne to power through 
a decade of guerilla struggle, have expressed their determination 
to restructure their distorted inherited political economies.
Assuming that leaders of a given mining ec riomy likewise sincerely
• : : 1 i new nol: ties’ t, c moe'~ p i' r ec*.n the need?
the people, experience elsewhere suggests the necessity, first,
6f formulating a long-term industrial strategy; and, second, imple­
menting major changes in key in. tituti^uo.
First, the government, working as closely as possible with the 
masses of the population in the ruaal areas as well as in the 
cities, should formulate a long-term strategy -- say for 20 years -- 
to increase productive employment oppcri .mitles in ever;, sector.
In essence, this requires capturing the surpluses produced in the 
mining sector and reinvesting them in specific projects carefully 
designed to augment productivity and living standards. Wherever 
possible, inputs for the mines and associated roads and Railroads, 
as well as nousing and consumer goods for the workers, should be 
produced locally, rather than impor. ted. The resulting increased 
market should facilitate formulation of physical plans to exp md 
output in other sectors of the economy. Feasants could be en­
couraged to cooperate to purchase new inputs and expand their output of 
crops to provide raw materials for new factories and foodstuffs for 
the growing industrial labor force. Their- increased incomes would
broaden the domestic markets for* new projects' outputs. Small 
scale indu tries could be established to process foodstuffs ar.d
tools t mbodying appropriate levels of technology both for agri­
culture and new small-scale industries.
Over time, basic industries could be constructed: a plant
to produce explosives might be linked with fertilizer output; or 
a factory might be built to produce standard zed trucks and public 
busses, first by assembling imported parts, later producing them 
in the country. Planners would need to assess the nation's ro-
*. di.r j lining .pi og
rrov1de t h < pee e: s a' i r.dof ? a date t Ch —
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nical and managerial skills. Given the small economic size of 
many mining economies, furthermore, some of the larger projects 
might require coordinated planning with neighboring countries.
Various published studies have suggested the kinds of inter­
related projects which a mining economy might construct within 
the framework of its long-term strategy. A lot of experience has 
been accumulated as to the problems and possibilities. A basic 
requirement, of course, would be a thorough-going analysis of the 
particular resource potentials and constraints in the given 
country. Planners would nedd to formulate careful physical plans 
for each project, explicitly detailing its relationship to the overall 
time sequence, spatial location, and linkages tc others to 
avoid disproportions and ensure viability.
Within the framework of a longterm strategy, the nation’s plan­
ners would need to formulate specific short term plans, say five 
or so years (the length of time required to establish a major 
industrial project and enable it to begin to produce successfully 
without unplanned losses). In these, they would identify the 
physical features of each project to be built during in the 
specific period, spelling out in detail their backwards and for­
ward linkages with the rest of the economy.
Parallel to these physical plans, the planners should formulate 
concrete financial plans, showing how the investments funds may be 
mouilizej for each project. In addition, they will need to plan 
for the education of appropriate cadres at each stage in detail.
In the second place, implementation of a longterm, strategy of 
the kind here proposed would require fundamental institutional 
enanges. llnfulfilled arc discarded plans abound in third world 
countri en. Analysis of the reasons for their failure reveals the
.. Q _
underlying cause as the attempt to implement them through inherited 
institutions and structures which were simply inapt for the purpose.
The explanation offered above suggests tne necessity of two 
interrelated sets of institutional changes: those relating to
structures of the state machinery des'gned to assume responsibility 
for formulating and-carrying out plans; and those facilitating par­
ticipation c the majority of working people in shat process.
The inherit .'d government machinery consists of ministries 
created primarily to luild infrastructure, assuming this would stimu­
late private investors to introduce needed productive act! \ities. 
Farastatals are typically grafted on as autonomous agencies tr 
fill the gaps private investors leave in the productive structure. 
Throughout the third world, the inadequate results of planning In 
this corn.ext urge that political leacers design new institutions to 
enable trie state to control what Fresident Tyerere of Tanzania 
has termed the 'commanding heights': basic industries, export-
import and internal wholesale trade, and the banks and financial 
institutions.
The state should exert direct control over basic industries, 
in particular the mines which shape tne ec nomy and its relations 
to the world commercial system. The form of control may, f C'-urse, 
vary depending on the fore' gn 'partner-' and the particular cir­
cumstances prevailing in the country. That there will be a 
foreign 'partner' for a prolonged period is almost inevitable*
The typical mining economy in Africa- has inherited from prolonged 
colonial rule few technically-qualified men or women to manage 
the mines; and very limited contact, with thv world comm rcial 
network through which It muse cell their ourput.
A potential mining economy t'fiterir
\V
int •oduc t: or
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various transnational • mining companies baser! in different countries 
to discover ..hich will provide the best deal. It may negotiate 
with one of the socialist countries which are, today, more able 
than in the past to provide tht necessary tecnnologies, markets, 
and capital in exchange for helping the mining economy to achieve 
a greater measure of industrial growth. (Footnote: As developing
countries themselves, the socialist countries have had less need 
for raw materials, less capital, and less advanced technologies 
than developed capitalist nations; but gradually tn.is situation 
is changing,) Or it may arrange with a wealthier developing 
nation ’with surplus capital to finance the mine and buy its 
output for a new pr ^ cessing plant in its own country. For example, 
several oil producing nations plan to utilize their natural gas, 
formerly simply burned off, to process aluminum, and hence may 
be willing to finance a mining project to produce the necessary 
ore, bauxite, or its semi-processed form, alumina. Obviously, 
the mining economy w -uld need to bargain with ary one of these po­
tential partners to get the best possible deal.
xhe mining economy that 'inherited* a transnational firm which 
nad for pars been exploiting both its mineral wealth and its labor
YVI o r c e hfio less choice. Xt cannot easily shift to another ' p a”trm r * 
because the transnational has already installed its own technology 
and marketing system, geared to the particular way the ore is 
mined* Getting spare parts for the mines' machinery may be diffi­
cult, and it may not be easy to find markets for the particular form 
in which the ores are exported. On the other hand, the company, 
toe, is to a certain extent trapped. It probably would be willing 
to renegotiate its rel -tionship with a resolute mining economy
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government in order not to lose its existing investments.
For the mining economy to arrive at the best possible arrange­
ment, whether it is entering on a new project or renegotiating its 
role in relation to an old one, depends crucially on its ability to 
identify the specific role which the mines can play in helping to 
realize a carefully.formulated longterm development strategy. The 
issue distinctly is not simply whether the government owns pi 
percent or more of the shares of ownership. Country after country 
has learned to its sorrow that ownership dees not necessarily imply 
adequate control.” jFofctnote: Long ago, Berle and Keans^exposed
the fact that in the U.S., ownership of shares in a large corpora- 1 
tion does not mean control; the managers of the corporation make thel 
key decisions. In a third world country, government ownership 
of shares in a transnational corporation's local subsidiary may 
merely mean that it it has paid -- often handsomely -- for the 
right to share the risks, but it has nos obtained adequate control 
over the management supplied by the parent f1rm.j
The mining economy must focus its attention on several aspects 
of the relationship it seeks to establish with its foreign 'partner' 
to ensure that the mine plays its intended role in overall ec r.omic 
transformation:
1 . The share of pfofits and foreign exchar.r earnings retimed to 
the government: The mining economy should seek, not only to maxi­
mize its returns, but also to avoid bearing the burden of world 
price fluctuations for its mineral exports in order to plan for 
orderly reinvestment in restructuring the economy ovep time. Whether 
by sharing profits, taxing income, or taking royalties, it will need 
to ensure that it obtains as regular, steady returns as possible 
in order to implement its plant without disruption.
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As this issue will be discussed elsewhere in this volume, it 
will not be further considered here, although it is clearly 
crucial. It is, if anything, more vital that the government 
does plan to reinvest its share of earnings to implement its 
long ter:-; development strategy designed to reduce its dependence 
on the mine, the foreign partner, and/or uncertain world markets.
2. The arrangements to train country nationals to take over 
the management, including specific numbers, skills, and timetables:
(Footnote: Promised affimative action to/train and upgrade national;
mining economies, as in the case of women and minorities in the
m
TJ.S., has turned out to be a cruel joke unless goals and timetables 
are established and, enforcedVf The categories of skills required 
must be|specified and agreements reached on how and over what time 
period nationals are to be recruited and trained for each one.
At'the same time, the government will neeo to ensure that while its 
nationals acquire appropriate skills, they also are imbued with 
and committed'to the notion that the mines must contribute to the 
implementation 6f the nation’s long term industrial strategy. This 
should help to pr*v<'r4 future managers and technicians aspiring to 
self-advancement rather than national welfare, although by itself, 
without the necessary institutional changes, it would accomplish 
little.
3. The construction of dual purpose infrastructure: Tne govern­
ment of the mining economy should ensure that, wherever possible, 
infrastructure built for the mine -- ports, roads, railroads, pov.er- 
projects, schools for training workers, hospitals or^clinics -- will 
contribute to increased productivity and/or higher living standards 
throughout the larger community. Sven in the construction of infra­
structure, government planners may be able to identify technologies 
and the use of materials which are more apj - orpi-i-atf to stimulate
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construct a road using local materials and truck haulage, rather than 
building a rail line out of imported materials straight from the 
mine to the por r . Over time, construction of road, feeding into 
the main road may facilitate the spread of agricultural and small 
industrial projects. The training of workers to make repairs on 
atandardizea models of trucks might contribute to transport de­
velopment throug.nout the economy. Eventually the standardized 
truck may b§ assembled in the country itself, and finally the parts, 
the body and even, after some years, the engineI produced locally. 
Planners need to weigh these kinds of possibilities along with the 
relative costs of construction and maintanance against the greater 
efficiency and heavier loans trains may carry.
lx. Local production of inputs: Hiring projects use a wice range
of inputs, from the basic equipment anc machines required tc blast 
out the ores, tc the fool, clothing and nousing needed by the mine 
workers. The foreign 'partners' often conclude it is more efficient
to import everything from their home countries, or ten a’J-y.f-n tin.-
their cwn profits by purchasing h V\ >fj from associated enterpri ses.
Government r,] r-, >•'; I*- f VI O 1mutt, ho\r v . y f jtudy 'which input t —~ -* • i- 1 ^1 * ■ O ‘ “
pr - d u c e d dlately in *’he r-ourit I*'. , -1 u-’ -k ‘ r.g pr,.i. • *• • V 1 - ^ -/ •
t ut op, ■* : tiwS i 'hr . • • ’ s o ° rh ■ , mioiny; amd v/hi ^
fi-i i_ he predun. ’ "c.- yea.: . ‘ "acr" ' : ac-_- ‘ ‘ ■ 1
transformation of the entire ecor „ . Obviously, food 3 tux f "z should
be locally prod’ ced from the outset. This requires eyeful attention 
to creating the necessary institutions to provide farmers wit.. 
rnar:eting, credit,, fertilizers and tools and processing f acliiti or- 
so they can increase tnei output. V/ithir a few years, simple tools 
like wheelbarrows and parte for sorts of oh - riipler mining mr-chin, 
and r- r p |Uor,> complex ipputs like explosi ’es might 1 e local";/ pro­
duce 1. i-v t..o end of ?' ,/■ arc, ’ t m.ay '• e poseisle to procure all
the inputs for which local raw materials are available or can 
easily be imported, contributing to thegrcwtu of domestic in­
dustrial capacity.
5. Utilization of outputs: Most minerals require major pro­
cessing before they can be sold to their fin^I consul,.ers: Iren must
be transformed to steel and shaped into rads, beams, tools and ma­
chines. Copper must be smelted, refined and fabricated into 
copper wires and cables, or combined with other minerals to pro­
duce electrical fixtures. Bauxite must be processed into alumina, 
smelted into aluminum and further fabricated into sheets for 
roofing, doors and window frames,pots and pans, or airplane wings. 
The typical small mining economy probably will be unable in the 
early years of industrialization to mobilize the capital or markets 
to construct processing facilities on a scale large enough to maxi­
mize efficiency to produce these, items for national use. It mign*t 
bo able to establish more advanced stages of processing if ± ; could 
arrange to rr.qrket a major snare of its more finished, and her.ee mere 
valuaole, output abroad * Or it might be able to cooperate with 
neighboring countries in a plar.n d regional development program in 
which eacn wi 1 ou_lrj a specific large scale project, bu..ed on 
its own resources, ae a pole of growth around which other planned 
industrial developments could oak-, placed
In form slating a pj_nap contnac. with its foreign partner, a 
mining economy’s government should weigh ail these p, ssibilities 
and arrange uXtm ag-cement tnat will contribute most effectively 
“° stimulating ^ho desired overall balanced, integrated industrial 
and agricultural grovjtn.
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To restructure its distorted raining economy, the government will 
need to exert adequate control over a second commanding height, the 
trading institutions, both foreign and internal, especially at the 
wholesale level. The typical third world nation's exports are 
almost entirely handled by transnational corporations. The trans­
national mining firm that operates the country's mines markets the 
ores that constitute the predominant share of the country's exports. 
The company usually also imports its own machinery and equipment,
NJ Poften from its associated branches in otner countries'; Transna­
tional tracing firms handle most of the other imports of consumer 
goods, concentrating on the more profitable items purchased by 
the narrow high income group, as well as machinery, equipment and 
semi-prdcessed materials utilized in other sectors of the economy. 
They <*)}<$ often buy these from other suosidiaries of their parent
companies, and sell them at the highest possible prices to maxi-/
rnize their profits, indirectly siphoning out a. share of the ir.vesta-
ble surpluses■generated in the economy.
The government must institutionalize direct control over these\
marketing networks t ensure that- they broaden overseas markets andlift arjt
obtain the best pr> ices/to maximize national returns from mineral 
exports. Simultaneously, they should reduce the import of consumer 
goods, machinery and equipment to the bare minimum required to comple­
ment and supplement the expanding output of industrial and agri­
cultural projects established in accord with the longterm plan.
State control will help ensure the prices of goods porVcuA do 
not include unwarranted profit margins for foreign firms. If several 
neighboring countries plan together for regional development 
make possible the construction of c mplomentary nasic indust •i'-s, as 
suggested above, each will need to exert direct control ever boat 
and imports to ensure that it carries out its p^rc of th-ex^  oi*t s
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regional plan; Each will have to purchase agreed upon-amounts of
the others' produce at agreed-upon prices in accord with longterm
competing
contracts; and neither can permit undisciplined import of/items 
by private traders seeking to reap higher profits.
Increased state control over the marketing of minerals abroad 
would facilitate expansion of sales to new markers, including 
those in competing capitalist, socialist, and neighboring countries.
The state trading agency could shop around for the best bargain 
in terms of prices and longer term contracts which might facilitate 
planning for reinvestment of surpluses to develop other sectors of 
the economy. The government could negotiate for sale of produce at 
more advanced stages of production which the foreign'partner' might 
refuse to initiate on its own.' {Footnote : Transnational firms '—
| typically do not invest in processing facilities in third world \
! mining economies, except to reduce initial bulk or transport costs;
! they prefer to send tneir ores to their home factories which ensure^
i y>
\ their ability.to retain control over the ultimate marketing networks;^ 
Tnc state could arrange with otnenproducers of the same minerals to 
act in concert to regulate output and raise prices along the ielatively 
successful lines of oil producing countries through OPEC, or the less
wervar.csuccessful appaoaches attempted by the copp Vard oauxite exporters.
A state trading agency could halt the expenditure of scarce 
foreign exchange to import luxury items for the ’wealthy, and augment 
the purchase of machines and equipment to implement its longterm 
industrial and agricltbral development. It could shop around for 
the best sources of supply, perhaps bargaining for an exchange of 
a part of the nation's mineral exports to obtain needed industrial 
outputs. Through control of internal wholesale networks, it scald
>n sure he increased distribution of necessities, tool^ and equipment
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throughout the economy, replacing imported items wn rever possible 
by goods locally produced in accord with the national development 
strategy.
Finally, experience everywhere throughout the third world
suggests that the state of a mining economy seeking to implement%■
a longterm development strategy must intervene directly to control 
a third, little understood commanding height, the banks and fi- 
nanaial institutions. These do not, as the layperson often believes, 
merely provide safe depositories for savings, pension funds, and 
insurance. Instead, they provide crucial channels for isve mobili­
zation and direction of investable surpluses produced in the economy. 
Too often, acting in concert with the mining and other transnational
\]y
trading firms wSith which they are associated, transnational banks 
an financial institutions simply siphon these surpluses out of 
the country -- a major but concealed explanation of the persistent 
capital shortage which plagues most mining econonie: despite decades
of product ion■and expert of rich minerals.
State control and reorganization of tnese institutions can 
contribute in several importan- ways t implementation of a ong- 
term devc'lo,m -nt strategy. First, it can ensure that they mobilize
and direc
uo singed
■n v»  ^XJacts
can provi
pro jeots
G X p Gnri i cu
j C C 3
t available surpluses within the framework of a carefully 
financial plan to the specific industrial anu agricultural 
Ter which physical plans have been drawn up. Secondly, it 
de a means of checking up on the way the mar.ggers of tt ose 
fulfil initial Investment plans, and their on-going 
re of working capital. Over time, the surpluses of these 
will be resumed to the banking system for reinvestment in
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the projects designed for the next stage of the overall development 
plan. Eventually, the banks and financial institutions will 
control and direct the major flow of funos created within the 
economy for investment; taxation i ill become decreasingly impor­
tant, since the state, through these channels, will directly super- 
ise the accumulation and reinvestment, in planned projects.
Increased state con rol over these three commanding .eights 
requires major institutional ' _ changes of two kind: .
The first involves the shaping of appropriate new institutions 
to enable the state to maximize the national benefits tj be obtained 
through exercise of its controls Clearly, she ole ministries and 
parastatal forms, inherited, from the colonial past, cannot perform 
the necessary roles; they, were designed sc 1 ;ave key decisions to 
private firms, which on:y replicated and perpetuated the external 
dependency relations of the past. Tor is it possible simply t' 
import models from elsewhere. Leading cadres must design appropri­
ate institutional forms in light of the particular problems and 
their causes,' drawing on the growing experiences of other.* countries 
pursuing similar paths only for initial guidance.
But a real langer exists here. The cadre assigned to this task 
must achieve two somewhat contradictory aims au the same time. They 
need to alter tne in. titutional machinery drastically to perform its 
required new role; and simultandously, they must keep it running i'n 
order tna
organs zat 
run chine re
t h o 3 e wh j
corrupt)
t the economy does not grir.p t. a standstill while the re­
ion takes place. Ir. mom than one country, keeping the 
going has dominated tre exercise, before long co-opting 
seek to carry it out into she eld (often incm. a -singly 
ways shaped by the old working rules of the very institu­
tions they sought to change. The m wait has : e-Ui trie  ^jo-z t 
re leased emergence of a .yo jins bur aucrat :c//.ar. ger:a± bour-soir. isDU:
wielding state power to advance its own interests.
The individuals themselves may not be to blame. Often t iey 
are ill-trained for their jobs. Colonialism did not educate 
• anager- for social change, but to perpetuate its_fp ’ofitable) 
machine. Often even those sincerely dedicated to their task of 
reorganization, find themselves caught up in a complex maze
of ole ways of doing things, pressured by foreign ’partners' with 
their own agendas. They don't knew what else to do. Before long, 
they cynically give up: They conclude there really is no other
way
oimply to change one set of faces by another, as repeated coup: 
in the few short years since African states attained independence 
attest, does not resolve the dilemma. ^Footnote: The young
1! ahanaian army officers' solution of simply shooting former <7cverning
I m VI officialsvwas a logical result of the assumption that individuals
\ |
\ not institutionalized ways of doirg _things_ -- were to blame, t "
Various devices introduced elsewhere may help to thwart tendencies 
towards the emergence of a bureaucratic/managerial bourgeoisie.
First, a sharply defined incomes policy must be built into the finaicia 
plan to limit the high salaries of new civil service and manggerial 
personnel. In the typical African state, about half the wages and 
salaries bill is paid to the top 10 percent of all employees, the 
supervisory and managerial personnel. Officials of newly independent 
governments, particularly in mining economies where transri *tional 
corporate personnel are likely to play a major role for a number"of
years, argue it would be discriminatory to reduce salaries of Africans ’ °! viQy i tatters' j\iy „ ______below those of expatriate managers or supervisory; -the I high salarie
they insist, are essential to induce them to remain ir. trie country.
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Yet these high salaries in reality constitute a significant 
drain on national funds which might otherwise be used either 
to raise the wages of tho $ in the lower income brackets or help 
to finance projects in rural areas to expand productive employment 
opportunities and raise living standards in less developed regions.
Th£ fact that expatriate personnel may remain for- some time cannot 
be allowed to excuse policies building in permanent inequalities, and 
this prolonged drain of potential investable surpluses.' Some countries 
have, therefore, reduced all supervisory and managerial salaries to 
levels more commensurate with the nation's ability to pay, and 
set aside specific allotments, if necessary, to ensure an adequate 
supply" of expatriate personnel until local cadre can be trained to 
replace.them." (Footnote: Personnel from socialist countries usuallyJ
;do not receive such 'inducement' incomes.)
The national incomes policy should be accompanied by some form 
of leadership code prohibiting civil servants, managers and political 
leaders from engaging in speculative real estate, trade, or other
vk"private business. Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola'have sought to 
reduce their opportunities to enter such fields by taking over rental 
housing as well as the major trading channels. These techniques help 
prevent individuals from utilizing their state jobs to advance their
private interests.
bot only do'these kinds of measures facilitate the mobilisation 
and direction of invdstable surpluses to new projects to spread 
productive employment opportunities throughout the economy; they also 
help to persuade the much larger numbers of poorer peasants and 
wage earners that the government and party leaders are serious in 
their stated goal of restructuring the nation's political economy" t 
fulfil their needs. This may be especially important in a mingng
a major share of the
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economy where the mines themselves produce 
investable surpluses. Unless the mire workers are convinced that 
the mine’s managerial and supervisory personnel, along with the 
rest of government, is dedicated to spreading productive employ­
ment opportunities to the rest of t'he population (including members 
of their own families, and even themselves if the mines are forced 
to cut back on employment due to workd market conditions), they I
are likely to press for higher wages. In country after country,
mine workers, whose wages constitute a relatively small share
of total mining costs (typically less than 25 percent), have pressed
for and won wages well above those of workers in other sectors of
the country. Phis tends to create a privileged aristocracy of
labor and spurs other workers to deunand wage increases that cannot
{-fobe paid without threatening|the spread of industrialization throughout 
the economy. 5ut no government or political leaders can expect to 
retain a shred, of legitimacy when they ask workers to restrain their 
wage demands if, at the same time, they themselves are seen to be 
living at levels far above those of the minors themselves.
Above ail, the difficulties of remaking the institution^ and 
working rules while keeping the machinery of state going renders 
imp rative tne discovery of ways to enable the bulk of the popu­
lation -- the wage earners, the peasantry, the growing numbers of 
urt- and under-employed -- to exert on-going constructive pressures 
cn those in charge of running the state. Tnose who stand to gain 
from the changes tc be made mu3t be able to participate in decision- 
making, forcing through the essential changes neede-d at all levels
mg term develcpmer.o strauc'gy^T^to impif rmnt the
Hero again a
wording ,1uplo.
jntradiction emerges: How can the masses of the
#>, many if tot most of them wit ho it even tne simple
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skills of reading and writing, participate in es ential decisi ns 
relating to such highly complex national arc international
mechanisms as those of a modern mining industry I £ar less all
the intricate associated institutions o'f’ foreign trade and money 
and tanking? It is one thing to create village democracy, ousting 
colonial appointees and traditional rulers to given men and even 
women'1 (Footnote; 'In Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau^the 
political leadership realized early in the decade of guerilla war 
fare that women, who produced most of the food and played a crucial I
role in the families, must be involved in the struggle directly by 
guaranteeing their parti ci a at. ton ip decision making at ail levels .jjT
a decisive say in how their village, in which they were born aid 
brought up, should be run. But how is it possible for them tc 
understand the impact on tneir lives of that far-away mining 
project, tied into a still more remote world cosimrcial network?
How can they learn what rust be done about it?
In Mozambique and Angola, the liberation movements, having 
wor^ a decade c-f guerilla war by mobilizing the working people and 
peas-ntry, ha’.'e concluded that the solution to this contradiction
V
lice in tne creation of a vanguard party whose members will nndc-r- 
stand and educate the masses of the peoples This, in itself, re­
quires continual vigilance in building the structures of th i party 
itself to ensure that its members remain dedicated to the rational 
political and economic transformation envisaged.
Inevitably, this process of change will take time. There 
will undoubtedly be a prolonged struggle, characterized t., the 
old adage, 'two steps forv.-ard, one step back’ as : now techniques
ar< devised to engage people at all levels in a participatory process 
of radically restructuring the institutions shaped by powerful 
mining companies and their associated trading and financia’ interests.
/Summary:
The typical African mining economy has inherited an externally
dependent dualistic economy dominated by transnational firms that
provide the sophisticated technologies, manage the mines (whether
or not they own them), market their ores, and drain out a significan
share of their investable surpluses. Efforts to attain: development
with at most marginal changes oi these institutions, shaped during
the decades of outright colonialism, have too frequently fostered
the emergence of a bureaucratic/nanagerial bourgeoisie eager to
perpetuate the status quo. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the
population vegetates in impoverished hinterlands or overcrowded
shabty compounds. ’./lien recessions grip the core industrial
dependent
nations, deepened pover y spreads througnout th"1/mining econo oy 
as living costs soar and growing numbers of workers lose their . 
jobs....
Ar.al.ysis of the underlying causes of this p-rvasive impoveuish- 
merit of the populations of ir.Lneral-ricn African states suggests that 
they are embedded in the inherited institutional structures and
working riles which leave their political economies geared to the 
uncertain world markets for their mineral exports under the control 
of transnational mining firms, and associated banks and trading 
institutions. This suggests the necessity of action by the state --
the only agency capable of taking such action -- to formulate a long 
term industrial strategy to restructure the economy to provide 
productive employment opportunities and raise living standards in 
every sector. To implement this strategy, the state must exert 
direct control over the commanding heights: the basic industries,
especially the mines; foreign and internal trade; and the banks and 
financial intitutio.es. This, in itself, will require fundamental
state struc 1 u rs , ther.se 1 ves .reorgan . O  f i  ‘J 1 t  1 C  » o I
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The political leadership which seeks to make these changes 
must impose an incomes policy and a leadership code to prevent 
the growing corps of government employees from taking advantage 
of thdr new positions of power. They will, simultaneously, need 
to involve the working people -- most of whom have at the outset 
little if any knowledge of the basic issues to be dealt with, 
far less what to do about them -- in the planning process. They 
may decide, as have Mozambique’s and Angola’s leaders, that 
this requires building a vanguard party.
Clearly this process of re-shaping and in some cases 
completely replacing existing institutions and working rules 
will be far from easy. Yet unless it is tackled, it is equally 
evident that the majority of the peoples of Africa's mining' 
economies -- like those of Latin America before them -- are 
likely to be condemned to lives of grinding poverty.’
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